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This paper develops an analysis of labor markets in which
the use of layoffs to effect employment separations does not
imply that markets fail to clear or that the amount of employment
is suboptimal relative to current perceptions. This analysis focuses
on the interaction between contractual arrangements for shifting
risk from workers to employers and tax—financed unemployment insurance.
The key element in the analysis is that unemployment insurance is
more attractive than risk shifting as a way for workers to obtain
income during unemployment. The paper also analyses the effects
of risk shifting and unemployment insurance on the magnitude of
employment fluctuations. The analysis implies that, given the
existence of unemployment insurance, the existence of risk—shifting
arrangements makes employment less variable.




(401) 863—26061.A Market-Clearing Model of Layoffs
The observation that cyclical fluctuations in real
variables such asaggregate employment appear to reflect
predominately the effects of changes in aggregate demand
for output poses two critical questions for macroeconomics.
First, what are the causes of fluctuations in aggregate
demand? Second, why do these fluctuations produce cycles in
real variables, rather than being absorbed by price and
wage adjustments as would be the case in a Wairasian model
of general equilibrium?
A broad concensus, which emerged at least a decadeago, seems
presentlyto prevail about the many issues associated
with the first question, concerned with the determinants
of aggregate demand. For example, there seems to be little
active current discussion about the relative influence that
monetary factors, fiscal actions, and endogenous phenomena
have on aggregate demand. Recent years, however, have
'seen intense research interest and associatedcontroversy
directed towards the second question, concerned with
identifying the characteristics of the actual economy that
are responsible for the non—Wairasian responses of real
variables to cycles in aggregate demand.
One popular approach, describable as Keynesian,
has been to attribute the causal relation betweenaggregate
demand and aggregate employment to a failure ofwages and
prices to adjust to equate quantities demanded and supplied
in labor and product markets. An essentialaspect of this
interpretation of the process of employment fluctuation is
thata contraction in employment resulting from a reduction
in aggregate demand involves a situation inwhich perceived
gains from trade are foregone. A frequent criticism of
this non-market-clearing paradigm has been that the theoretical
development in the existing literature provides no convincing
rationale, based on neoclassical premises, forsuch a persistent—2—
failure to realize perceived gains fromtrade.For example, in the
book by Barro and myself, the determination of the vector ofwages
and prices at which buyers and sellers are constrained to transact
is based on ad hoc gradual adjustmentprocesses. The choice—
theoretic analysis is concerned mainly with the implications of
such essentially arbitrarily specified wage—price vectors for
the determination of employment. Some other models rationalize
gradual wage and price adjustment on the basis of adjustment costs,
which is logically adequate, but convincing stories about the
precise nature of these costs do not seem to exist.
Despite this problem, the non-market-clearing paradigm
has remained popular primarily because it has seemed to be
realistic. The analysis in the presentpaper questions
the accuracy of this impression. Itsuggests that the prevalence
of layoffs as a mode of employment separation does notprovide
evidence of chronic failure of labor markets to clear and
that the conventional view that in cyclical
contractions workers typically confront excess supply in
labor markets and are unable to obtain desiredemployment
may involve a misinterpretation of the facts.
The basis for this revisionistargument is the recent
theoretical development of the hypothesis that actual
labor market transactions typically involveimplicit contractual
arrangements that stabilize worker income by shifting risk
from workers to employers. This hypothesissuggests the
possibility of rationalizing stickiness of wage rates and
explaining the alleged symptoms of non—wage rationing of employ-
ment, such as layoffs, without invoking the failure of markets
to clear.
The main specific objective of the presentpaper is to
develop an analysis of labor markets in which the use of
layoffs to effect employment separations does not imply that
the amount of employment is suboptimal relativeto current—3—
perceptions.This analysis suggests that the non—Wairasian causal
relation between aggregate demand and aggregateemployment results
not from the failure of markets to clear, but frommisperceptions
of the terms of trade between labor services andconsumption goods,
as hypothesized by Friedman (1968), Lucas (1975), and others, and
integrated into a model of risk shifting by Azariadis (1968).
Having focussed on these alternative explanations, it is worth
stressing that non—walrasjan fluctuations in.employment in either
case are wasteful and undesirable, whether they result from the
failure to realize perceived gains from tradeor from the failure
to perceive gains from trade correctly.
The risk—shifting hypothesis plays a criticalpart in the
present analysis, but by itself does not provide a full account
within a market-clearing framework of the diversephenomena as-
sociated with layoffs. An adequate analysis oflayoffs seems to
require, in addition, explicit allowance for theconsequences of
tax—financed unemployment insurance.
Asecond specific Objective of this paper is touse the
model thatincorporates both risk shifting and unemployment
insurance to reconsider previous analysis ofthe effects of
risk shifting on the magnitude ofemployment fluctuations. The
present analysis shows that the quantitative effectsof risk
shifting and unemplcymentinsurance are not additive.When analyzed
separately, both risk—shifting arrangements andunemployment insurance
seem to magnify employment fluctuations byincreasing the respon-
siveness of labor supply to shifts in labor'sperceived real
compensation. However, in the analysis below, the introduction
of risk shifting into a model that allows forunemployment
insurance has the Opposite effect ofreducing employment fluctuations.—4-
2.Layoffs as a Mode of Employment Separation
Before reviewing recent analyses of risk shifting and
unemployment insurance, it will be useful to have clearly in
mind the characteristics of layoffs as a mode of employment
separation. Layoffs involve the following four phenomena:
(P1) Employers follow the administrative procedure of
assigning workers to the status of unemployment. Thus, the
term "layoff" in the present discussion refers broadly to
any separation, i.e., suspension or termination ofemploy-
ment, that the employer initiates. In other words, the
status of being laid off denotes a proximately passive role
for the worker in becoming unemployed. For simplicity, the
analysis below also implicitly assumes that a worker who is
laid off is available to return to work whenever his employer
him. HoweverehdIg th.e na1ysis to allow workers
to choose to change jobs would not alter themainconclusions.
(P2) When employers lay off some workers, presumablyindicating
a decrease in the demand for labor services, they typically do
not reduce wage rates for those other workers who continue
to be employed. This practice seems inconsistent with the
neoclassical inclination to view wage rates aschanging to
equate quantities of labor services supplied and demanded.
(P3) Workers who are laid off usually receiveno income from
their employers. In this respect, a layoff is notdifferent
from other modes of job separation.
(P4) Employers typically use seniority classificationsto
determine which workers are laid off. In practice,a worker's
seniority classification depends mainly on his length of
service with a particular employer, but can alsodepend on
other factors, a frequent one being hisage. As the following
discussion indicates, rationalizations for (P1) and(P4) have
not been hard to invent, but no singleapproach has been able
to account readily for both (P2) and (P3)—5—
3. Suirirnary of Recent Literature
The essential idea in the theory of risk shifting in labor
markets is that a systematic difference between firms and their
workers with regard to risk aversion leads tolong—term
commitments in which the firms absorb risk that wouldotherwise
be borne by the workers. These commitmentsimply that actual
relations between firms and workers implicitly involvetwo
transactions. First, firms purchase from workers labor
services for use in the productionprocess and, second, firms
sell to workers private insurance against undesirableincome
fluctuations. Workers engage in these transactionsjointly
with a single firm, instead of selling labor servicesto
one firm and buying insurance from another, because the
- productionrelation between firms and workersmitigates the
problems of monitoring and enforcement thatarise in the
insurance relation. As a result ofthese contractual
arrangements, a worker's wage income equals either thevalue of
his marginal contribution tooutput minus an implicit insurance
premium or the value of his marginalcontribution to output
plus an implicit insurance indemnity,depending on whether
the perceived real value of labor'smarginal product, which
is a stochastj variable, ishigh or low.
Risk shifting in effect creditspart of the value of product
when it is high to an implicitpremium that yields an implicit
indemnity when the value of product islow. This arrangement
enables the worker to use productgenerated in states in
which consumption would otherwisebe high to boost consumption
in states in whichConsumption would Otherwise be low.
Consequently, risk shifting increases theattractiveness of
working when the value of product ishigh and decreases the
pressure to work when the value of product islow relative to
what would be the case if incomeand consumption in each state
were equal to the value of product in thatstate. This
reasoning explains the result, derived inAzariadis (1978)
and Grossman (1978),thatrisk shifting makes the level of
employment more variable.—6—
Turning to the characteristics of layoffs, the idea that
labor market transactions involve risk shifting has provided
what seems to be the only choice—theoretic explanation for (P2)
the surprising wage rate stickinessassociated, with layoffs.
The basic observation is that the insurance aspect of labor
contracts serves to stabilize worker income and, thus,
explains why reductions in the quantity of employment typically
do not also involve reductions in wage rates.
The relation between risk shifting and productive
efficiency also suggests a simple explanation for (P1) ,the
administrative proôedures associated with layoffs. Efficiency
requires that a worker be employed in a particular state of
nature if the utility associated with being employed and
receiving the value of his marginal contribution to total
product equals or exceeds the utility associated with
not being employed.However, with risk shifting in effect,
a worker's wage income does not equal the value of his
marginal contribution to total product. As a result, his
wage income cannot serve, as would the wage rate in a spot
market, to signal the worker as to whether it is efficient
for him to accept or to reject employment.Consequently,
in order to achieve efficiency, the implicit labor contracts
must specify each worker's employment status as a function
of the perceived real value of his marginal product.
Moreover, in order to economize on the costs of acquiring
and processing information, the contracts delegate to the
employer the administrative function of assigning workers
to employment or unemployment.
Despite the essential nature of these insights, the basic
analysis of risk shifting has the problem that it seems to
imply too much. Specifically, it does not allow for (P3)—7—
and (P4), the failure of employers to provide a constant, fully
insured income for all workers.
The model in Grossman (1978) attempts to remedy this problem
by allowing for incompleteness and inter—worker differences in
risk shifting. This extended model rationalizes (P4), the role
of seniority in determining the incidence of layoffs by
assuming that worker productivity increases with age and with
length of service with a particular employer. In addition,
in an attempt to account for (P3), the fact that laid-off
workers typically receive no indemnity income from their
employers, this model assumes the worker reliability is related
to seniority. The problem of worker unreliability results
from the possibility that the prospect of short-run gains, when
the value of their marginal contributions to output are high,
can induce workers to quit their jobs. Differences between
more and less senior workers in their reputations for reli—
ability, which relate to their behavior when the perceived real
value of marginal product is high, produce differences in
the terms at which they can obtain income when the perceived
real value of marginal product is low. Specifically, less
senior workers, whose average reliability is low, contract
for less stable incomes. -
Whateverthe actual importance of reliability considera-
tions, the correspondence between the implications of this model
and (P3) is unfortunately less than completely tight.
Specifically, the model provides no reason why lower seniority
classes should purchase from their employer exactly zero
insurance against reduced income in those instances whenpro-
ductive efficiency dictates that they be unemployed.—8—
The effects of tax—financed unemployment insuranceon
the variability of employment are similar to the effectsof
risk shifting. The existence of unemployment insuranceincreases
the attractiveness of working when the value ofproduct is high
because a worker both earns hiswage income and becomes eligible
for unemployment insurance benefits and decreases the
attractiveness of working when the value of product is low
because benefits make unemployment more tolerable.
With regard to the characteristics of layoffs, thekey
characteristics of unemployment insurance are thatan unemployed
worker can receive benefits only if hisunemployment is
"involuntary" and that the amount of these benefits are reduced
by the amountofany other income that the worker receives
when unemployed. These eligibility rulesprovide inducements
for (P1), by which firms take proximateresponsibility for
job separations, and for (P3), the discontinuance of income
payments by firms to laid off workers. In addition, in this
context, as in the analysis of risk—shifting arrangements,
the association of productivity with senioritycan readily
account for (P4), the role of seniority in determining the
incidence of layoffs.
The existence of unemployment insurance,however, provides
no explanation for P(2), the constancy ofwages for employed
workers. Existing theoretical models of theeffects of
unemployment insurance——for example, Baily (1977) and
Feldstein (l976)-—simply introduce (P2)as a realistic assump-
tion. However, (P2) is the onlyqualitative economic feature
of layoffs that is clearly distinctive.In contrast, (P1) is
Only an administrative procedure and (P3) and(P4) are
not peculiar to layoffs as a mode ofjob separation. Thus,
the inability to account for (P2) isa critical problem.—9—
Another possible objection to focusing on unemployment
insurance is that the use of the layoff mode to effect
employment separations has not been historically associated with
the advent of the current centrally administeredprograms of
income maintenance for the unemployed. However, thisobjection
is not serious if the eligibility rules and financingarrange-
ments of earlier privately and locally administered income-
maintenance programs generated the same incentives as current
programs.
To summarize, existing analysis suggests that both risk
shifting and tax-financed unemployment insurance increase the
variability of employment. However, neither models of risk
shifting nor models of unemployment insurance can readily explain
the full set of phenomena associated with layoffsas a mode of
employment separation. The following sections show that
analysis of the interaction between risk shifting and unemployment
insurance both alters this conclusion about the effect of risk
shifting on employment fluctuations and also produces a more
Satisfactory theory of layoffs.
4.Analytical Framework
The simple economy analyzed in thispaper differs from
the setup in Grossman (1978) by allowing forunemployment
insurance but abstracting from reliability considerations.In
this economy, there are twolarge groups of individuals that
differ in their attitudes to risk.One large group of
identical individuals behaves ina less risk averse, or even
risk neutral, manner. Theseindividuals choose the role of
entrepreneurs, who organize production byforming firms and
employing inputs, including labor services.10 -
Thesecond large group of individuals behave in a more
risk averse manner. These individuals choose the role of
employees, who work for the firms and provide labor services.
As indicated above, this difference between the attitudes
toward risk of entrepreneurs and workers provides the basis
for risk—shifting arrangements.
The analysis assumes, for simplicity, that all workers
have the same utility function, and that this utility
function is additively separable in consumption and the
amount of time devoted to employment. Consumption here
refers to consumable commodities purchased in the marketplace
and employment refers to working as an employee of a firm.
Individuals can use time not devoted to employment for home
production of other consumable commodities.
The analysis also assumes that labor services are
homogeneous and that each worker has only a single unit of
time to devote to employment. It would seem fairlystraight-
forward, although not essential for present purposes, to
extend the analysis to take explicit account of variable hours
of work.
A more important assumption is that individual workers
differ with. respect to the number of units of labor services
that they provide per unit of employment time. The analysis
assumes that the classification of potential workers according
to age and length of service with a particular employer
yields classes of increasing average productivity. It is
convenient to index these seniority classes according to
increasing seniority. Let the nonnegative variablek denote
the average productivity of the th class of workers, wherek— 11—
measuresthe average number of units of labor services provided
by individuals in this class per unit of employment time.
Thus, the lowest seniority class has the lowest k and the
highest seniority class has the highest k.
Workers exchange their labor services for consumption goods
through a network of markets. Let w denote the basic real
wage rate, which is the perceived exchange ratio between
consumption goods and a unit of labor services. Changes in w
represent perceived "real" disturbances, which is important
because, as Barro (1977) has stressed, the productive
efficiency of competitively determined contracts implies that
in a contractual labor market, as in a spot market, dis-
turbances percei.ved to be "monetary" would not affectemployment.
Competition in the contractual labor market insures that w
equals the perceived value of the marginal product of a unit
of labor services. See Grossman (1978) for a derivation of
this result. Whether or not the relevant perceptionsare
accurate does not matter for the present analysis.
From the standpoint of the workers, the variable w is
stochastic and is determined at periodic intervals byserially
independent drawings from an exogenously determined population.
The interval between these drawings defines a unit of time.
-
Thepopulation of w is such that
w with probability
w=
w with probability ,
wherew > w > 0 and + a. =1.Thus, w characterizes a 2 1 1 2 2
good state of nature and w characterizes a bad state of nature.
1
The assumption that there are only two states is a convenient
simplification. See Grossman (1977) for a more generalsetup.
In the rest of the paper, the subscripts 1 and 2 denote the
values of each. relevant variable in the two states.— 12*
Theanalysis abstracts from the holding of assets-—including
investment goods, commodity inventories, and financial assets——by
individuals. Allowing for the holding of either real or financial
assets would make the analysis both more realistic and more
complex, but would not seem to change the main conclusions. The
key observation in this context is that, because the accumulation
of assets involves foregoing consumption and because the
probability is always positive that the next state will be
bad, optimal worker or firm asset management would not involve
using stocks of assets to achieve complete stability of worker
Consumption.
5.Employment Without Risk Shifting and Without Unemployment
Insurance
In order to appreciate the significance of risk shifting
and unemployment insurance and their interaction, this section
begins the analysis by abstracting from these arrangements.
This section and the next section, which allows for risk
shifting, review relevant aspects of the analysis presented
in Grossman (1978) .Subsequentsections extend the analysis
to consider unemployment insurance and the interaction between
risk shifting and unemployment insurance.
As indicated above, competition generates a vector of
basic real wage rates, denoted by (w,w), that are equal to
the perceived value of the marginal product of a unit of labor
services. Noreover, the standard theory of human capital
tells us that in the present context, which among other things
abstracts from training costs, employers could not take
advantage of the firm specificity of their senior workers'
productivity without impairing their-long-run ability to
attract employees. Consequently, income possibilities for
workers in the th class in the two possible states of nature
are w k. and w k..
12. 21
Given these income possibilities, each worker selects the
vector of employment and wage income that maximizes his— 13—
expectedutility. In formulating this problem, the present
analysis assumes that workers take a myopic view that abstracts
from the dependence of productivity on thelength of service.
Thus, suppressing the subscript 1, the worker'simplicit problem
is to choose the vector (2. ,2. ,12 ,12 ), where 2.measures units
.1 2 1 2
of employment time and12 measures wage income, so as to
maximize
ECu—v) =a[u(.c ) —v(2)] + a (u(c ) —v(2.)] 1 1 1 2 2 2
where c measures worker consumption, u(•) isincreasing and
concave, and v(.) is increasing and convex, subject to the
constraints,
2. ={O,1}, 2.={o,i},c =12,c =12, 1 2 1 1 2 2
12 =wk2. ,and12 =wkL
1 1 1 2 22
These constraints say that in each stateconsumption equals
wage income and that wage income equals either the product of
the basic wage rate and productivity if theworker chooses
employment or zero if he chooses unemployment.
Depending on a , a , w , w , and k, the solution to -
1 2 1 2
this problem can prescribe for a particularworker employment
either in both states, only in thegood state, or in neither
state. In choosing among these options, theworker selects
the largest of the following possible valuesof E(u—v):
For employment in both states,
E(u-v) =au(w k) + a u(w k) -v(l) A(1,l). 1 1 2 2
For employment only in the good state,
E(u—v) =au(O) + a u(w k) —av(O) —av(l) A(O,1) .1 2 2 1 2
For employment in neither state,
E(u—v) =u(O)—v(O)EA(O,O)— 14—
Comparisonof these expected values reveals the following:
A(l,l) is largest iff wk > z,
A(O,l) is largest if f w k < z < w k, and
1 2
A(O,O) is largest iff z > wk,
where z satisfies u(z) =u(O)—v(O)+ v(l)
This solution implies that a worker desires employment in a
particular state of nature if his possible income in that
state is sufficiently high to make the net utility associated
with. being employed and consuming this income at least as
large as the net utility associated with not being employed
and not consuming market goods.
The determination of which classes of workers are
employed in each state of nature requires assumptions about
the distribution of the k1. Specifically, ifka is such
that w k =zand k ,whereb > a,is such that w k = 2a b
workers in class b and higher classes are employed in both
states of nature and workers in classes a through b—i are
employed only in the good state of nature. Individuals whose
productivity is less than ka are not employed in either state.
An important aspect of this analysis that ignores risk
shifting and unemployment insurance is that the basic wage rate
varies from state to state in such a way that, inany state of
nature in which a worker is employed, his income is equal to
the value of his marginal contribution to output. Thus, each
worker's income and consumption, whether or not he is employed
in both states, is lower in the bad state than in the good state.
In addition, the basic wage rate in each state of nature,
which together with his productivity determines his potential
income in each state, signals the worker as to whether or not
the utility associated with being employed and receiving
the value of his marginal contribution to output in thatstate
equals or exceeds the utility associated with not being— 15—
employed. In other words, the active decisions of workers to
accept or reject employment lead to productive efficiency.
Consequently, there is no need for the labor contracts to
specify each worker's employment status as a function of the
state of nature and, hence, no need foremployers to take on
the administrative task of assigning workersto employment or
unemployment. In this context, adjustments in employment
reflect solely wage—induced movements along thesupply
schedule of labor services and, except for the relation
between employment and seniority, exhibitnone of the
characteristics associated with layoffs.
The observation that each worker, whether he isemployed
in both. states or only in the good state, hashigher consumption
in the good state than in the bad state alsosuggests that
the labor market in this analysis does not share riskin an
efficIent way. Specifically, the riskaverse workers would
prefer more predictable and stable consumption and the lessrisk-
averse firms might be prepared to offer their workers a more
predictable and stable income schedule.
6. Risk Shifting
This section introduces risk shifting, but continuesto
abstract from unemployment insurance. Riskshifting allows -
each.worker's wage income in a particular state ofnature to
differ from the value of his marginal contributionto output
in that state. As a result, efficient riskshifting can
produce increased expected utility for the workers whileat
the same time producing an increase orno decrease in expected
utility for the entrepreneurs.
Competition in the market for labor contracts thatimplicitly
involve risk shifting generates, in addition tothe basic real
wage rates, an exchange ratio, denoted by p, at which workers
give up income in the good state in return for income inthe
bad state. Risk shifting in effectprovides the worker with
additional income in state one equal to (2 —wkL)in exchange—16 —
fora reduction in income in state two equal to (w ki —
2 2 2
The price of risk shifting, p, is the ratio of the expected
value of the reduction, a (w k2.-c￿ ), tothe expected
2 2 2 2
value of the addition, a (— wk2. ).
1 1 1 1
A hypothetical value of p equal to unity would
characterized an actuarially "fair" price for risk shifting
and would imply that workers could obtain a constant income
at no cost to themselves in average income.Actually,
we seem to observe that risk shifting reduces but does
not eliminate income variability, even for workers who
are employed in all states of nature. Specifically,
although wage rates are sticky, they are not fixed. In
addition, although not explicitly modelled in this paper,
worker incomes vary with changes in hours of work.
These observations suggest that in fact p exceeds
unity, but is not so large as to make risk shifting unattrac-
tive.According to the analysis in Grossman (1977; 1978)
a value of p above unity implies either that entrepreneurs
are iisk averse, or that w is much. larger than w, or that
workers sometimes behave unreliably.
With risk shifting, the worker's problem is to choose
the vector (2. ,2. ,c,c )so as to maximize E(u—v) ,subjectto





1 1 2 2
pa (.c2- wk2. )= a(w k2.-). 1 1 1 1 222 2
This last constraint describes the terms of risk shifting.
For example, for the special case ofp equal to unity, it
would say that the worker can exchange with his employer
income in the good state for income in the bad statesubject
only to the condition that the expected value of his income— 17
equals the expected value of his marginal contribution to
output, which is equivalent to the expected value of the
product of the basic wage rate, his productivity index, and
his employment status.
We can describe the solution to this problem in two
parts. One part says that, given his choice of employment in
each. state of nature, the worker allocates his income between
the two states to satisfy the first-order condition
u'Cc )= put(c), 1 2
where u'(.•).is the marginal utility function. For the
special case of p equal to unity, this condition wouldimply
that the worker sets 2 equal to 2,sothat c equals c
1 .2 1 2
which means that his consumption isperfectly stable and
predictable.
To obtain solutions for and 2 for the case of p
1 2
greater than unity, consider a family of u(c) functions that
exhibit constant relative risk aversion. The membersof this
family are u =(.l-r) for r1 and u =lnc for
r =1,where r measures relative risk aversion.For this
family, the above first—order condition becomes
=l/r,
which,when substituted into the constraints,implies






The second part of the solution to the worker'sproblem
says that, given thecrjterjon for allocation of consumption
between the two states, the worker determineshis employment— 18—
ineach. state. Depending now on ct, a, w, w, k, and p,
the worker again can choose employment in both states, only in
the good state, or in neither state. In deciding among
these options, the worker now selects the largest of the
following possible values of E(u-v):
For employment in both states,
pctwk+ciwk pcLwk+wk E(u—v) = u(
1 1 2+aU(Pl/r
1 i 2—v(l) S(.i,l
1pa ÷p a
2
For employment only in the good state,
awk
E(u—v) =au(
22l'r ) +au( 22 ) —av(O) —av(l) 1pa +p
/a
2 + L/r 1 2
1 2 1 2
ES(O,l).
For employment in neither state,
E(u—v) =u(O)—v(O) S(O,O).
In corttparing the worker's options with and without risk
shifting, observe that S(O,O) is identical to A(O,O), but that
concavity of u() implies that S(O,l) is larger than A(O,i)
and that S(.l,l) is larger than A(l,l). Moreover, concavity
of u(•) also implies that the value of wk that is necessary
and sufficient for S(l,l) to be larger than S(O,l) is larger
than z and is an increasing function of wk.
These results mean that risk shifting increases the
range of combinations of w k and w k for which the worker
1 2
chooses employment only in the good state and decreases the
ranges of combinations of w k and w k for which the worker
1 2
chooses employment in both states and neither state.
Because risk shifting allows the worker to use the value of
his marginal contribution to output in the good state to
supplement his actual income and consumption in the bad state,
the value of working in the good state is larger and he— 19—
desiresnot to be employed in the good state only if wk is
sufficiently less than z. In addition, because risk shifting
allows the worker to consume market goods in the bad state
without working in the bad state, h.e desires to beemployed in
the bad state as well as in the good state only if wk is
sufficiently more than z. Moreover, the larger is wk, the
larger has to be wk for the worker to desire employment in
both states.
As before, the determination of which workersare employed
in each state of nature depends on the distribution ofthe k.
Again, the higher productivity classes of workers choose
contracts that specify employment in both states ofnature,
whereas lower productivity classes of workers choosecontracts
that specify employment only in the good state ofnature, and
the lowest productivity individuals are notemployed in
either state of nature. However, this analysis confirmsthat
with. risk, shifting fewer classes of workersare employed in
both. states of nature and more classes of workersare employed
in at least one state of nature. Both of thesechanges mean
that more individuals now experience variableemployment.
The most important implication of this sectionrelating
to phenomena associated with layoffs is that riskshifting
gives all workers, including those who are employed in both
states or only one state, less variablewage income. In
addition, as noted above, an essentialconsequence of the
shifting of risk from workers to firms is that a worker's
contractual income does not equal the value of hismarginal
contribution to total product, and, hence, it doesnot serve,
as would the wage rate in a spot auction market, tosignal
the worker as to whether or not it is efficient forhim to
accept employment. Thus, this analysis confirms thatallowing
for risk shifting readily accounts for(P1) and (P2) and is
consistent with (P4),butthat the implications of risk
shifting at the same time seem to be inconsistent with(P3),— 20—
thefact that workers who are laid off usually receive no income
from their employer.
7. Unemployment Insurance
This section introduces tax—financed unemployment
insurance, but abstracts from risk shifting. The analysis
assumes that the unemployment insurance works as follows:
A fund is financed by taxes and pay benefits to unemployed
workers. The net transactions of this fund are the only
difference between the aggregate value of current consumption
and the aggregate value of current output. Only workers
who are not proximately responsible for the change in their
own status from employed to unemployed can receive benefits.
Use of the administrative procedure. (P1) satisfies this
restriction.
The amount of the benefits received by an unemployed
worker depends directly on his earnings when employed.
—For the United States, the average replacement ratio of
benefits, which until recently have not been taxable, to
after—tax income seems to be slightly larger than one—
half——Feldstejn (1978) .Forsimplicitly, the analysis assumes
that average and marginal replacement ratios are equal.
However, the analysis specifies that the amount of benefits
would be reduced by the amount of any income that the
unemployed worker received from his usual employer. This
provision is apparently realistic and is crucial for the
interaction, analyzed in the next section, between unrnp1oyment
insurance and risk shifting.
For unemployment insurance to be actuarially "fair,"
the expected value of the taxes effectively paid to the
unemployment insurance fund by each worker would have to equal
the expected value of the net benefits he receives from the
fund. It is possible that such an outcome would obtain if
there were full experience rating in the calculation of each—21—
firm's contribution to the fund and benefitswere taxed like
other income. Actual unemployment insurance doesnot satisfy
these conditions and apparently is actuarially favorable to
workers who receive positive benefits andactuarially
unfavorable to workers who do not receivebenefjts——Feldstejn
(1976). For simplicity, the analysis abstractsfrom taxes,
except for the financing of the unemployment insurance
fund.
The worker's problem now is to choose thevector
(p,,, ,c,)so as to maximize E(u-v), subject to the
12 1 2
COnstraints
={o,i}, ={0,l}, 1 2
c=tl—T)2+b,c =(l—r)Q 1 1 2
2=wk, 2 =wki,
1 1 1 2 2 2
B,if £ =1 and.Q =0






where r is the effective tax rateon wage income for the
unemployment insurance fund and b is theamount of the
unemployment benefit. According to these specificatjois,if
an individual works only in the goodstate, b equals 2
and r equals h. Otherwise, bequals zero and r equals
g. Consumption in state two equals after—taxwage income.
Consumption in state one equals either after—taxwage income
or b.
Actuarially fair unemployment insurance would haveg
equal to zero and h equal to act/ct. Assuggested above,— 22—
itis probably more realistically to suppose that g is
positive and that h. is less than Ia ,whichmakes the
1 2
system actuarially unfavorable to workers who are employed
in both states and actuarially favorable to workers who
are employed only in the good state.
The net replacement ratio is equal to /(l-h). We
can easily calculate that unemployment insurance that was
actuarially fair and complete, which would mean a net
replacement ratio equal to unity, would have g equal to
zero, h equal to a, and equal to a.
Depending now on a ,a,w,w,k,g, h, and ,
1 2 1 2
the solution to the worker's problem again can prescribe
employment either in both states, only in the good state, or
in neither state. In choosing among these options, the
worker now selects the largest of the following possible
values of E(u—v)
For employment in both states,
E(u—v) =auf(l—g)wkj+aU((l—g)wk]—v(1) 1(1,1).
For employment only in the good state,
E(u—v) =au(w k) +a u[(l—h)w ki —av(0) —av(l) 1(0,1).
1 2 2 2 1 2
For employment in neither state,
E(u—v) =u(.0)—v(0) 1(0,0).
In comparing the worker's options with and without
unemployment insurance, observe that 1(0,0) is identical to
A(0,0) and S(0,0), and that, for actuarially fair and
complete unemployment insurance and actuarially fair risk
shifting, 1(0,1) is identical to S(0,l) and larger than
A(0,l) ,and1(1,1) is identical to A(1,1) and smaller than
S(1,1) .Theserelations mean that fair and complete unemploy-
ment insurance implies a range of values of w k for which
2
the worker chooses employment in neither state that is the same— 23—
aswith fair risk shifting, a range of combinations ofw1k and
w k for which the worker chooses employment only in thegood 2
state that is larger than with fair risk shifting, anda
range of combinations of w k and w k for which the worker
1 2
chooses employment in both states that is smaller than with
fair risk shifting. These results mean that the introduction
of fair and complete unemployment insurance wouldcause
fewer classes of workers to be employed in neitherstate
of nature, more classes of workers to beemployed in only
one state of nature, and fewer classes to be employed in
both states of nature, and that the latter two effectsare
larger than would result from the introduction of fair-
risk shifting.
Extensions of these results are straightforward.
Given actuarially fair unemployment insurance,making the
net replacement ratio less than unity——which wouldmean
g =0,h = /cL ,buth < aand < a -—would reduce 1 2 1 2
1(0,1) and, hence, reduce the increase in thevariability
of employment. Alternatively, givencomplete unemployment
insurance, making taxes actuarially favorable to individuals
whose employment is variable——which wouldmean 1—h,
but h < a and> a——would raise 1(0,1),andmaking taxes
actuarially unfavorable to individuals whose employment
is constant——which would meang > 0——would reduce 1(1,1)
Both of these changes would boost the increasein the
variability of employment.
It is worth noting that the effect ofactuarially fair
unemployment insurance on the variability ofemployment
depends on workers' being risk averse. If workerswere
not risk averse, unemployment insurance wouldmake employment
more variable only if it were actuarially favorableto
workers who are employed only in thegood state, as in
Feldstejn (1976), or actuarially unfavorableto workers who
are employed in both states.— 24—
Thisanalysis also confirms that focusing only on
unemployment insurance does not provide an adequate model of
layoffs, because, although it is consistent with (P1), (P3)
and (P4) ,thisanalysis cannot account for (P2) .Specifically,
in this section, the actual wage rate and income received
by a worker who is employed in both states varies with the
value of his marginal contribution to output.
8.Risk Shifting and Unemployment Insurance
This section combines the analyses of the previous two
sections to consider the interactions between risk shifting
and unemployment insurance. With both risk shifting and
unemployment insurance available, the worker's problem is to
choose the vector (2. ,2. ,1 ,2 )soas to maximize E(.u—v),
1 2 1 2
subject to the constraints
£ ={0,l},£ ={0,l},
1 2
c =(l—T)c2+ b, c =(l—t)2
1 1 2 2
pct(Q -wk2.)=c(wk2. —2),
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 - ,if2. =1 and2. =0




This set of constraints creates the complication that a
worker who chooses employment in the good state and
unemployment in the bad state has the alternative of receiving
income in the bad state either from risk—shifting arrangements
with his employer or from unemployment insurance benefits.
Note that, because benefits are paid only to replace lost
income, this worker has no motivation to choose a combination— 25—
ofrisk shifting and unemployment insurance benefits.If he
chooses risk shifting, his net income is(l-g)cLwk/(pcj +p1"cL)
in the bad state and in the good state.
If he chooses unemployment insurance, hisnet income is
(1—h)w k in the good state and w k in the badstate. 2 2 Ifrisk shifting were actuarially fair-—i.e.,p =1——and
unemployment insurance were actuarially fair and complete——i.e.,
g =0and h =8cr/a——thesealternatives would both provide
constant net income equal to cwk and would beequally
attractive. However, as discussed above,p actually seems
to exceed unity, which makes riskshifting less attractive,
and actual unemployment insurance isincomplete but seems to
be actuarially favorable tounemployed workers,
characteristics that have offsetting effectson its
attractiveness. These considerationssuggest that it is
reasonable to suppose that workers who chooseemployment
only in the good state find unemployment insuranceto be
preferable to risk shifting. Note, however, thateven if
such workers find risk shiftingunattractive relative to
unemployment insurance, risk shifting remains attractivein
reducing income variability for other workers who choose to -
beemployed in both states.
Under these conditions, the workernow selects the
employment status that corresponds to the largest ofthe
following possible values of E(u-v):
For employment in both states,
Pawk+cLwk 1/ pctwk+cwk E(u—v) =ctu[(l—g)
1 1 2 2j+ctu[(1—g)p




— v(1) SI(1,l).— 26—
Foremployment only in the good state,
E(u—v) =cs.u(w k) +ci.[(l—h)w k] —cv(0) — ci.v(l) SI(0,l).
1 2 2 2 1 2
Foremployment in neither state,
E(u—v) =u(0)—v(0) SI(0,0).
In evaluating the worker's options with both unemployment
insurance and risk shifting, observe that SI(0,0) is identical
to 1(0,0), that SI(0,l) is identical to 1(0,1), and that
SI(1,l) is larger than 1(1,1). These observations imply that
the range of values of w k for which the worker chooses
2
employmentin neither state is the same with both unemployment
insurance and risk shifting as with only unemployment
insurance, but that the range of combinations of w k and w k
1 2
forwhich a worker chooses employment in both states is
larger with both unemployment insurance and risk shifting than
-with only unemployment insurance.
These results enable us to draw the following two con-
clusions: First, although the .introduction of risk shifting
into a model without unemployment insurance would tend to
magnify employment fluctuations, the actual effect of risk
shifting in economies that have unemployment insurance is
probably to make employment less variable. This result
obtains as long as unemployment insurance is more attractive
than risk shifting for most workers as a way to obtain, income
during states of unemployment. Under these conditions
the availability of risk shifting does not make unemployment
any more tolerable, but it does make stable employment more
attractive.
Second, allowing for the effects of both risk shifting
and unemployment insurance enables us to account for the full
set of diverse phenomena associated with layoffs. The— 27—
administrativeassignment of workers, (P1) ,resultsfrom the
fact that risk shifting makes wage incomeunequal to the value
of product and/or from the eligibility rules forunemployment
insurance benefits. The constancy ofwages for employed
workers, (.P2), directly reflects risk shifting. The fact
that workers who are laid off usually receiveno income
from their employer, (P3), results from the attractiveness
to them of unemployment insurance relative to riskshifting.
Finally, the role of seniority in determining the incidence
of layoffs, (P4), reflects the relation betweenage and
length of service and productivity.
9.General Implications
As indicated by the preceding paragraph, thispaper
has developed explanations for the phenomena associatedwith
layoffs without reference to a failure of labor markets to
clear and a loss of perceived gains from trade. Thisanalysis
-implies that, although a laid—off worker migh.t want to work
if offered either the wage rate he received whenhe was
employed or the wage rate inclusive of insuranceindemnity
received currently by more senior workers whoare employed,
he would typically not want to work at thewage rate equal to
the perceived value of his marginalproduct. Thus, the
use of layoffs to effect employment separations doesnot imply
that the amount of employment issuboptimal relative to current
perceptions.
This interpretation of layoffssuggests that, as mentioned
above, it may be realistic to attribute thecausal relation between
aggregate demand and aggregate employment tomisperceptions of the
exchange ratio between consumption goods andlabor services,
resulting from the limited ability of economicagents to
distinguish aggregate disturbances fromrelative disturbances,
rather than to an alleged failureof markets to clear. Other— 28
recent work incorporating risk shifting arrangements into
the paradigm of incomplete information supports this point of
view. For example, Grossman (1979) shows that the
existence of risk—shifting arrangements in labor markets
strengthens the substitution effects that influence the
choice ofthe efficient level of employment, implying that
only weak restrictions on worker utility functions are
necessary for changes in current nominal marginal products
relative to perceived prices or expected future marginal
products to have a strongly positive effect in employment.
Finally, it is worth stressing again thatemphasizing the
failure to perceive gains from tradecorrectly does not mitigate
in any way the wastefulness ofnon—Wairasian fluctuations in
aggregate employment and the undesirability ofmonetary and
fiscal policies which produce fluctuations in aggregate demand.— 29—
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